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PANEL I: The End of Equivalents?
Examining the Fallout from
Festo
Moderator:
Panelists:

John Richards*
J. Michael Jakes†
Herbert Schwartz‡
Harold C. Wegner§

PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you, Dean Treanor.
What we are going to do first is have opening statements from
each of our panelists here. They are going to talk for ten minutes
or so on their views of the Festo situation, and then we are going to
open up into a general discussion, and those in the audience who
feel they want to contribute are heartily encouraged to do so.
Our first speaker will be Professor Wegner. Professor Wegner
is a Partner at Foley & Lardner in Washington, D.C. For many
years he ran the IP program at George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. He is sometimes credited with opening up the
knowledge of Japanese patent law in English-speaking countries
by the work he did when he was a visiting professor in Tokyo
several years ago. He has spoken widely and written widely on IP
subjects, particularly in the patent field. He is a regular contributor
to the Annual International Intellectual Property Law and Policy
Conference that you have here at Fordham in the spring.
*

Partner, Ladas & Parry, New York, New York. Adjunct Associate Professor,
Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Cambridge University, 1966; M.A.,
Cambridge University, 1970; LL.B., University of London, 1979.
†
Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, Washington, D.C. B.S.,
summa cum laude, Duke University, 1979; M.S., Johns Hopkins University, 1983; J.D.,
magna cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center, 1986.
‡
Senior Partner, Fish & Neave, New York, New York. B.S., Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1957; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1964; LL.B., cum laude,
University of Pennsylvania, 1964.
§
Partner, Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C. B.A., Northwestern University, 1965;
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969.
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With that introduction, Hal, if you would like to start off,
please.
MR. WEGNER: Thank you very much.
I will make this introductory portion very brief to provide
everyone with a little grounding on where we stand with Festo.
Then, we’ll turn the program over to these two distinguished
panelists—trial litigators who have all sorts of insights of their
own. Later, after you all have had a chance to talk, I would like to
offer some comparative insights.
Just when we thought the Festo nightmare was over, on
September 20, the Federal Circuit acted1I don’t know what
water they are drinking inside the Beltway.
You know,
Washington, D.C. combines the best of the North and the South,
northern charm and southern efficiency.
[laughter]
They have done it again. After all the scholarly criticisms that
Rooklidge2 and Tramposch3 and others have had of the Federal
Circuit for their judicial legislation, their en banc advice, look
what’s happened. (You know, you learned in law school, some of
us many years ago, some of you now, that in the common law
system you should take matters case by case and you don’t have
advisory opinions).
The Federal Circuit goes out of its way, it seems, to give en
banc dictum. They can’t wait to fill in the blank spaces. It has
taken hundreds of years for the common law to develop, and they
just can’t wait to fill in every little blank space. After the Festo
Supreme Court remand, they had some open spaces, so they were
going to fill in the blanks.
1

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
2
See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal
Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000)
(suggesting that the Federal Circuit should take care to avoid forms of decision-making
best left to the trial courts).
3
See Albert Tramposch, The Dilemma of Conflicting Precedent: Three Options in the
Federal Circuit, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 323 (1989) (discussing ways in
which conflicting precedent may be resolved in the Federal Circuit without resorting to
en banc consideration).
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On May 28 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Federal Circuit, saying: you are wrong about a flexible bar on
equivalents and you are right about any narrowing amendment
creating an estoppel, but now here are some loose ends.4
So on September 20, at least seven of the twelve members of
the court were drinking this funny water, because they could have
issued a simple panel opinion and remanded the case back to the
district court, telling the court to take a look at the issues the
Supreme Court has raised and answer their questions. Then, the
issues could have percolated back up to the Federal Circuit. But,
no! En banc—it takes seven of the twelve regular judges to create
an en banc order—they told the parties to now brief four issues,
and the bar, the public, to brief two general issues: whether juries
or judges should decide some of the issues in Festo and what tests
should be used.5
Already, the Bar Association of the District of Columbia has
filed an amicus curiae brief.6 The period is still open, I think until
November 19, for other bar associations to file briefs. Maybe
some of my co-panelists will shed some light on which groups are
still actively considering such action. I see the smile on Mr. Jakes’
face; maybe he is involved in one of them.7
My message to the court, if anyone is listening, is you can still
undo your mistake. Nobody put their name on the en banc order.
The grant of an en banc order is anonymous. It takes seven of the
twelve regular judges to create an en banc order. So please, seven
of you, would you please take this back? Please rescind this en
banc order.

4
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–42
(2002).
5
See Festo, 304 F.3d at 1290–91.
6
Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party on Behalf of the Patent,
Trademark, & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia,
Festo, 535 U.S. at 722 (No. 00-1543), http://www.ipcreators.org/pdf-files/Merits%20
briefs/dcbar.DOC.
7
See Brief For Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association, Festo
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.) (No. 95-1066),
vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), http://www.aipla.org/html/festo99.html.
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Just imagine what happens if the court now issues another en
banc opinion. There is this en banc order for briefing, another en
banc hearing. What’s the difference? If you have an en banc
decision called Festo, maybe the Supreme Court will take
particular notice. Maybe if the Federal Circuit issued a decision in
a case called “Jones v. Smith” or “Bob v. Mary” or something like
that, maybe it would not get so much attention. But Festo! It
would seem like almost a challenge to the Supreme Court to
review the case one more time.
So where do we stand, briefly, on Festo? If you aren’t familiar
with Festo, the conference organizers in this wonderful book of
symposium materials, in the first fifty or sixty pages, provide the
several opinions of the court.8 And then I have an outline called
“Festering Questions After Festo,” so you don’t need to take
notes.9 I will just go through this as an outline before turning the
microphone over to the co-panelists.
The first section is an overview that discusses the new
September 20 en banc order.10 The hearing is on February 6, 2003.
And then who knows when a decision will come2003 or 2004.
In the final two minutes before I turn the panel over to my
colleagues, I would like to discuss the issue of equity. Ten years
ago or so, in Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit en banc, in a split
opinion, said that equivalents is an issue for the jury, not an equity
issue.11 I think that the doctrine of equivalents should be an equity
issue. I am saying that as a pragmatic answer, because if it is an
equity issue, then it is a matter for the judge.
I would like to see the doctrine of equivalents handled by a
judge and applied in rare situations, only where there is a very
compelling case. I am not totally alone. Judge Plager, Judge Linn,

8

Opinions appearing in the symposium materials included Festo, 535 U.S. at 722;
Festo, 234 F.3d at 558; and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17 (1997).
9
Harold C. Wegner, Festering Questions after Festo, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891 (2003).
10
See id.
11
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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and some others agree with this position,12 but the majority from a
decade ago did not.13
So in my discussion at pages seven through eleven, I say
reopen the equity door. My plea against en banc dictum is called
“Clouding the Future with an En Banc Dictum,” at pages eleven
through fourteen.
To me, as a student of the law, I think the Court of Appeals, as
opposed to the Supreme Court, should be judging cases on a caseby-case basis when facts require it, and not to be prospectively,
from the eighth and ninth floors of Madison Place, giving
pronouncements as to what the law should be for all situations.
The law should develop, in my opinion, in the way it has done for
centuries in the common law system, on a case-by-case basis,
where there is a holding necessary for the case.
With that as a background, I’d like to turn the panel over to
John.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Okay.
The next person to give their brief introduction is Herb
Schwartz, who is a Senior Partner at Fish & Neave, a strong
supporter of the law school here and a regular speaker at our spring
conferences. He is a Fellow of the American College of Trial
Lawyers and the American Bar Foundation. He has written a
textbook, Principles of Patent Law.14 He is in Who’s Who in IP,15
Best Lawyers in America,16 The One Hundred Most Influential
Lawyers in America,17 and he is extremely well regarded
throughout the patent profession.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, John.
As a practitioner rather than as an academic—although I
dabble in academia at times—I will talk a little bit more about
12

See id. at 1536–45 (Plager, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1521–22.
14
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (2000).
15
Who’s Who in IP, LEGAL TIMES, May 7, 2001, at 28.
16
GREGORY W. SMITH & STEVEN W. NAIFEH, THE BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA 2003–
2004 (10th ed. 2002).
17
Margaret Cronin Fisk, The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America, NAT’L L.J.,
June 12, 2000, at A1.
13
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some of the practical aspects of what has happened in Festo since
it has come down, because that is something I have to deal with a
little more. In terms of whether it is a good idea or a bad idea for
the Federal Circuit to do what it has been doing, I think that is
something I am not going to change in my lifetime, and therefore I
am really not going to spend much time worrying about it at this
point.
What is interesting to me is to see what has happened since
Festo in terms of what they have asked to be considered en banc
and what some district courts have done,18 because the real issue
ultimately is how this plays out in the district courts in the first
instance, and then ultimately what happens on appeal.
Basically, it has been hornbook law for a long time that
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents are a question of law,19
whatever that means, or basically limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents based on things happening in the file wrapper are
questions of law.20 I think people have assumed that file wrapper
estoppel is a question of law.
But what has happened since the Supreme Court in Festo is
that the Federal Circuit and some district courts are focusing on
whether or not there are factual issues which underlie an ultimate
determination of a question of file wrapper estoppel.21 You are
getting into something that almost sounds like you may have Festo
hearings as well as Markman hearings22 someday, and you may
have Festo hearings which could even be factual.

18

See, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel barred infringement by the doctrine of
equivalents, since the equivalents in question were known substitutes and the patent
owner did not include them in the amendments to the claims); Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v.
Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., No. 00-CV-9089, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2002).
19
See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 345 (5th ed. 2001).
20
See id. at 362 (explaining the equitable nature of file wrapper estoppel).
21
See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14923,
at *8.
22
A Markman hearing is a court’s review of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to
construe the asserted patent claims as a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is a matter for a
judge and not a jury).
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To me, the most interesting situation that brings this up is
illustrated by two very recent cases involving Glaxo Wellcome.
Glaxo Wellcome was a plaintiff in two lawsuits against two
different defendants in two different courts.23 Here in the Southern
District of New York, in Glaxo Wellcome v. Eon Labs
Manufacturing, Inc.,24 the court considered the question of what
happens in the Festo situation;25 the court decided that there was a
triable issue of fact with respect to the foreseeability of a particular
chemical as a sustained release agent, and denied summary
judgment on the ground of file wrapper estoppel.26
In a suit on the very same patent two weeks later, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, a
different federal judge with exactly the same facts before her, and
having full well in mind what the Southern District of New York
did, decided precisely to the contrary.27 She held that there was
nothing to try, that she could decide as a matter of law that there
was file wrapper estoppel, and she essentially dismissed the
complaint.28
So we now have the situation where what one district court
decidesthat, as a practical matter, not only is there something to
look at from a factual point of view, but you are even entitled to a
trial on it, maybe even possibly a jury trial.29 For me, that is a
startling consequence. That is something that seems to be just a
simple engraftment on the doctrine of equivalents.
To me, if this is the beginning of the unraveling of all of this, it
is just hard to know where it is going, other than possibly to make
patent litigation even more expensive and complicated than it is
now. I guess for a practitioner maybe that is a good thing; but for
the system, I do not think it is a good thing that it is making the
system even more expensive and complicated. And if we layer this
sort of problem onto it, it will get even worse. Obviously, the
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950.
See id.
See id. at *14.
See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
See id. at 1093–97.
See Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14923.
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Federal Circuit has this in mind when they want to consider
whether foreseeability, tangentialness, and reasonable expectations
are questions of law or fact.30 How they ultimately deal with that
and what they say and whether they leave it a question of what you
would call Markman-type mixed law and fact,31 which is for a
court to decide, or whether they would call it simply a question of
true fact, which you would leave for a jury to decide, really
remains to be seen.32
I will just finish very briefly. There are some glimmers of the
court’s meaning when you look in the Johnson decision,33 a recent
well-known decision, where Judge Rader thought that
foreseeability is a factual issue,34 and Judge Lourie said, if it is a
factual issue, we are going to have jury trials on it.35 This was not
in the Festo context, but in the context of Johnson, about what was
foreseeable—what happens as to what is disclosed in a
specification, and whether you have to claim it.36
So you can already begin to see the sides forming in the
Federal Circuit as to whether foreseeability is a question of fact or
a question of law. Where it will come out, no one knows, other
than, as far as I can tell, to increase the complexity and expense.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you, Herb.
Our third panelist this morning is Mike Jakes, who is a Partner
in Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner in
Washington, D.C. He is also an adjunct professor, teaching patent
law in Washington, D.C. He has a book on patents before the
Federal Circuit, which is well used by those of us in the profession.
30

See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
31
Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996).
32
See id. (holding that judges are more capable of interpreting claims because of their
special training, the technicality of the claims, and need for uniformity in the system). But
see SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that in patent cases, damages are a question of fact and properly reviewed by a
jury).
33
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
34
See id. at 1056–59 (Rader, J., concurring).
35
See id. at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring).
36
Id.
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He has handled many, many appellate cases before the Federal
Circuit and he wrote the AIPLA (American Intellectual Property
Law Association) amicus brief on Festo itself,37 so he is well
suited to tell us about it.
MR. JAKES: Thank you very much. I am very pleased to be
here this morning. Thank you for inviting me.
I did smile when Hal mentioned the amicus briefs that are
currently being filed, because I had the opportunity to participate
in the original briefing process as counsel for the amicus AIPLA.38
Since then, unfortunately, clients have lined up on both sides of
that issue, and because of positional conflicts, I have not been
allowed to put anything in writing before the Federal Circuit, as I
would like to. So I would like to take today to at least express
some of my views.
MR. WEGNER: Hopefully, unfettered.
MR. JAKES: People who practice frequently in front of the
Federal Circuit are usually concerned with the day-to-day of how
to win a case, and so if you will indulge me, I would like to be a
little more philosophical today because it is something that we do
not often get to do.
I would like to start with why I think the Federal Circuit did
what it did in Festo. In my opinion, the doctrine of equivalents has
been the single issue of the court’s jurisprudence that has defined it
over its twenty-year existence. From the Hughes Aircraft case,39 to
Pennwalt40 in the 1980sand I was there for the Pennwalt
episode, clerking for Giles Richto now the Warner-Jenkinson41
and Festo cases,42 the Federal Circuit has devoted more time, more
37

See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association, Festo
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 951066), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), http://www.aipla.org/html/festo99.html.
38
See id.
39
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
40
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
41
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
42
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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energy, and certainly more pages to the doctrine of equivalents
than any other issue. While I think the court’s effort has been very
noble and they at times tried to do what they can to improve the
doctrine, I believe it is still inherently uncertain and will always be
that way.
I would like to read a quote by Judge Learned Hand—who was
probably one of our greatest patent judges—from a 1929 opinion
that I have quoted many times, Claude Neon Lights.43 Speaking on
the doctrine of equivalents, he said: “It is obviously impossible to
set any theoretic limits to such a doctrine.”44 And as for the hope
of certainty, he said: “Each case is inevitably a matter of degree . . .
and other decisions have little or no value. . . . Any decision is
bound to have an arbitrary color . . . .”45 I think that is as true
today as it was in 1929.
Despite these warnings, the Federal Circuit has tried to set
theoretical limits to the doctrine and I think Festo was just the
latest example. But instead of going to the root of the problem,
which is the inherent uncertainty of the doctrine, I think Festo went
to a branch, which was prosecution history estoppel, and sawed it
off.46 And although the majority in Festo said that the flexible bar
rule had become unworkable,47 in my view it is certainly no worse
than letting a jury decide the function-way-result test or
insubstantial differences.
So the certainty, if any, that was gained by the Federal
Circuit’s decision was in simply eliminating a certain number of
cases for which the doctrine of equivalents could apply.48 I think
the supporters of the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar rule would
agree with that.
There was an amicus brief filed by three very large companies,
IBM, Ford, and Kodak, and they cited uncertainty as a policy

43
44
45
46
47
48

Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 576.
Id.
See Festo, 234 F.3d at 567.
See id. at 595.
See id. at 566–67, 577–78.
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supporting an absolute bar.49 But I really think it was the
uncertainty of the doctrine itself that motivated them, rather than a
focus on prosecution history estoppel. I think companies such as
this benefit from not having a doctrine at all. They have large
patent portfolios, they have large scopes of literal infringement that
they can assert, and most often the doctrine of equivalents is used
as a weapon against them than the other way around.
So what was wrong with the Federal Circuit’s approach?
Well, first, it changed the rules for a million or more patents.
In Warner-Jenkinson, Justice Ginsburg had given fair warning that
this could be a problem.50 She specifically wrote about upsetting
the rules of patent prosecution and the settled expectations of
patent owners.51 And if we know one thing, the Supreme Court is
usually a conservative body when it comes to property owners.
Second, the Festo decision, and even as it continues,
complicates patent prosecution.52 It makes the usual give and take
between an applicant and examiner more difficult.53 In this
respectand this is a particular notion of mineit puts too much
focus on the attorney, which is something I really do not like in
litigation. I think the focus should be on the merits of the
invention. So you can have two patent applications with identical
claims prosecuted in two different ways and could end up with
different scope, and that puts the focus on the attorney rather than
the merits.
And finally, I do not think the Federal Circuit’s decision could
be labeled anything other than judicial activism. The doctrine of
equivalents is purely a judicial doctrine, and what the court gives,
49

See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543).
50
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
51
See id.
52
See Noreen Krall & Celeste B. Filoia, The Doctrine of Equivalents: An Analysis of
the Festo Decision, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 373, 383 (2001)
(concluding that the application of prosecution history estoppel as delineated by the
Federal Circuit in Festo will increase the number of claims filed in a given application
and alter the scope of claim coverage to avoid narrowing amendments that would trigger
the Festo effect).
53
See id.
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it can certainly take away. But it is nothing more than a balancing
of economic interests, and no one elected Federal Circuit judges to
make these important decisions of industrial policy. So I think that
the decision had problems from the start.
What about the Supreme Court’s decision? Did it do any
better? Here I have a couple of other quotes I would like to read.
In one article, a member of the bar was quoted as saying that
the rumors of the “demise of the doctrine of equivalents have been
greatly exaggerated, much to the relief of the holders of the
approximately 1.2 million patents still in force.”54
Another member of the bar, quoted on approximately the same
day or two after Festo, said that the Supreme Court has only
“tweaked” the Federal Circuit’s decision, replacing the absolute
bar with a presumption that “will be difficult to overcome.”55
What is the correct position? Well, as you might expect, I
think there is certainly an element of truth in both. I think patent
owners relying on equivalents today are better off than they were
right after Festo, but certainly no better off than they were before
the original Festo decision.
For the particular issue at hand, the Supreme Court, I believe,
is following the path that it set out in Warner-Jenkinson, creating
another rebuttable presumption, this time holding that the
presumption of surrender could be rebutted if the equivalent was
unforeseeable, tangential to the amendment, or not “reasonably be
expected to have [been] described”56I particularly like that
phrase.
These exceptions will require case-to-case development. I
agree with Hal that that is the way it should be and that the Federal
Circuit’s attempts to answer broad questions en banc have not
usually been very successful.
Now, there are a couple of inklings in other cases as to how
these exceptions might go. One that I will cite to you is
54

Gary Young, High Court Buttresses Patent Rule, NAT’L L.J., June 3, 2002, at A11
(quoting Albert Keyack, partner at the Philadelphia office of Schnader Harrison Segal &
Lewis LLP).
55
See id. (quoting Gregory Castanias of the Washington, D.C., office of Jones Day).
56
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
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SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.57 This
is an Eastern District of Virginia case decided after the Festo
Supreme Court decision, where the court took a very narrow view
of the unforeseeability exception, holding that the failure of a
patentee to draft an intermediate claim that would have covered
both the disclosed species of the inventions and the accused
product flunked the Festo test, and so held that there was
prosecution history estoppel.58
But there is some hope with this tangential relationship test. In
another case, Vardon Golf v. Karsten Manufacturing Corp., out of
the Northern District of Illinois, the court held that the presumption
had been rebutted; the limitation for which equivalents was
asserted was not the focal point of the narrowing amendment.59 So
maybe there is some promise there.
These cases are interesting, but the real question is what the
Federal Circuit is going to do. I don’t know how good a job the
court will do in addressing these en banc questions. But the truth
is, I think it is just the beginning.
As Herb Schwartz mentioned, there are other questions that we
are going to be faced with, for example: What type of evidence is
going to be allowed to rebut the presumption; will we be seeing
extrinsic evidence, maybe expert testimony, on foreseeability? Are
we headed toward Festo hearings, similar to Markman hearings?60
Are we going to hear from experts who are skilled in the art, or are
we going to have to put patent attorneys on the stand to explain
what a reasonable person drafting claims would have done in this
circumstance? I do not view that as a good development.
But to return to where I started, for answering these questions,
I don’t know that the application of the doctrine of equivalents will
be any more certain. In fact, I do not believe that it will, and I
think that is the lesson the Federal Circuit has taught us over the

57

214 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2002).
See id. at 588–89, 592.
59
Vardon Golf v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., No. 99-CV-2785, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11802,
at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2002).
60
See supra note 22.
58
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last twenty years, that no matter how hard you try, there is inherent
uncertainty in the doctrine.61
So the fundamental question to ask ourselves, and one that we
may discuss this morning, is: are we prepared to live with that
uncertainty? The Federal Circuit, at least in the Festo case,
seemed to say that it was not.62 Should we be thinking about
alternatives to the doctrine of equivalents? Should we abolish the
doctrine of equivalents as not being worth the effort?
As you may or may not knowand Hal Wegner wrote an
excellent paper on this subject about ten years agothe doctrine of
equivalents has a long history, dating back to at least the 1800s,
before patents even had formal claims, and it was a doctrine of
equity.63 I agree with him on that view.
But today, inventors are allowed to draft their claims more
broadly than the specification discloses. They are allowed to get
whatever coverage they can, consistent with the statute and the
prior art and the examination process, and maybe that should be
enough.
Well, occasionally mistakes are made. Attorneys do make
mistakes. Inventors do not appreciate the full scope of their
invention. So maybe we do need the doctrine of equivalents, or
something like it.
One thing we might discuss or consider is whether broadening
reissue is an available option that should be expanded to allow
people to correct their mistakes. The current practice for valuable
applications is to continue filing applications, one after another, to
keep an application pending in the Patent Office, to in effect do
61

The Federal Circuit has redefined the doctrine of equivalents over the last twenty
years. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741
F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
62
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 577–78 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
63
Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1, 6–16 (1992).
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that, keep correcting the mistakes, broadening the claims so that
they cover new devices as they come out.64 That, itself,
ameliorates a lot of the harshness of the doctrine of equivalents.
So I would ask you to consider whether or not it has outlived
its usefulness and whether the whole debate over prosecution
history estoppel is really just a question of whether we should have
a doctrine at all.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you. That is a very
provocative ending there.
The Supreme Court, of course, in Festo, itself went through
these uncertain issues and came to the conclusion that this is one of
the prices we have to live with.65
Hal, do you want to make any comments?
MR. WEGNER: Yes.
You know, normally you want a panel where you have people
fighting, scratching, and clawing against each other. I totally agree
with everything that Herb and Mr. Jakes have said.
There are two ways to look at post-Festo. One is in litigation,
which we will probably want to spend most of our time on, but
also in solutions and how do we deal with things as a practical
matter.
Two things were suggested by what Mr. Jakes said. First, we
could fix the reissue statute.66 The reason the reissue statute does
not work is because intervening rights are keyed to the grant date.67
So when is it that you start to spend a lot of time worrying about
the scope of your patent? You file hundreds of patents. But then,
when you start to commercialize a product, then you start to spend
64

See Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Approach for Patentees to Prevent Competitors’
Trivial Modifications, CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY & RES. ON INTELL. PROP. NEWSL.
[CASRIP] (Univ. Wash. Sch. L.), Winter–Spring 1999, http://www.law.washington.edu/
casrip/newsletter/newsv5i4us3.htm.
65
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740
(2002) (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are
settled law . . . . Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate
expectations of inventors in their property.”).
66
See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
67
See id.
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some real moneydo we have an ironclad situation here? And if
you do not have the right scope of protection, at this time you are
the pioneer; there are no intervening rights at that time because
nobody else is playing in the game. If intervening rights were
keyed to the filing date, then there would be no problem. But the
way the statute is constructed, intervening rights are keyed to the
date of the grant of the reissue,68 which could take several years.
So I would very much like to see intervening rights keyed to
the filing date of the reissue. If Finnegan Henderson or Fish &
Neave prosecutes every case, we would not have to worry about
the problem too much. They would have some nice claims. But
not everybody can afford to go first class. We’ve got to think of
the little inventors who cannot find their way to New York to do
that. So once the troops come in and they see that a patent has a
little technical defect that could be fixed by reissue, we should
encourage correction. I think that is a very admirable solution that
we should seriously consider, just moving the intervening rights
date to the filing date and not to the grant date, and maybe
extending the length of time for seeking reissue.
The other thing is also the Jakes solution, the continuing
cases.69 I call them Vogel70 trailers. Did you know that pork is not
meat? Did you know that? I didn’t either, until 1970, when the
Court of Customs and Patents Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor
court of the Federal Circuit, said that pork is not meat, or they are
not the same invention.71 So you take whatever claims you can,
you file a continuation with a disclaimer, and then you keep that
new case pending forever and ever and ever, and then you add
claims when you need them. Now, that is not a very good public
policy. But, it is something that is an effective way to deal with
the problem. We do it all the time.

68
69
70
71

See id.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
See id.
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And then, we also encourage secrecy of inventions.72 You
would like to encourage people to file and publish and let the
public in on things. But the ironclad rule in most corporate
environments, which are concerned about the scope of protection,
is you file today, you file early and often, and then you keep things
secret for eighteen months. That is the magic date when there is a
publication of the first application.73 But by keeping things secret
for eighteen months, you file a matrix of cases to flesh out every
possible, conceivable area in the interval. That is not good public
policy either. It is expensive and it takes a lot of time and effort.
That is what we, as a pragmatic matter, are doing.
I have not prospectively relied on the doctrine of equivalents in
any filing strategy ever. You do not do that. When it is fourth and
twenty-seven, then you are going to try to get relief through
equivalents. It’s a last ditch remedy, something one does not
prospectively rely upon.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Herb.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I do not have much to add.
The one observation that I would make, which goes I think
even a little further than Mike’s, is to look back to when the
Federal Circuit was started, and see what it was trying to
accomplish. The first thing that it accomplished was a sea of
change in the increase in the validity of patents in the patent
system.74 It really turned day into night or night into day, however
you want to characterize it, in terms of making patents something
that were respected and would be sustained, and at the same time
greatly increasing their value.
At the same time, and shortly thereafter, I believe that the court
embarked on a conscious policy, that once you have a valid only
patent, you should try to get as much certainty as you can into
determining what its scope was, so that people could understand
72

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (stating that the patent application should be kept
confidential by the Patent and Trademark Office, and that no information regarding the
patent application should be given to anyone without the authority of the applicant).
73
See id.
74
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Court Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000).
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what their metes and bounds were.75 I think an awful lot of the
decisions of the court have really been directed to that aim over the
last ten years, and I believe that that is where they are still going.
I think that is what is really driving all of this. It is driving the
notion within the court that, in exchange for valid patents, since
they don’t throw things out for obviousness unless a stiff burden is
met,76 we are going to make you have claims that people can
understand and respect. Big corporations have been pushing this
because they want to know the metes and bounds of issued patents.
I agree with Mike that they can afford to get many patents of
limited scope.
I think that this drives a lot of this. I am in sympathy with the
notion that we should have a limited doctrine of equivalents. I
think that the court, given its druthers, falls back upon every
mechanism they can to convert infringement issues to questions of
law.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Do you see the Federal Circuit’s
views on written description being tied in with this approach that
you have just outlined?
MR. SCHWARTZ: Oh, yes, very much so. It is the very same
thing. The written description enablement77 is the same thing; they
do not want to allow you to have claims that are any broader than
what you exactly teach. It is going to be part and parcel of the
same notion—yes, we’ll give you valid patents, but you better
stake it out, you better describe it, you better enable it, and you

75

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the presence of one or more claims “particularly
pointing out and distinctively claiming the subject mater which the applicant regards as
his invention”).
76
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (stating that the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined by a tripartite test: “the scope and
content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved”).
77
Enablement requires the inventor to disclose the method pursued in creating the
invention so that “any person skilled in the art or science to which the invention or
discovery appertains” could duplicate the invention. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (2003).
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better claim it in the way that anyone can understand when they
read it.78
MR. WEGNER: Both Herb and Mike have pointed to a very
important aspect of how the Federal Circuit views patents. There
is a large corporate mentality: “We can afford to get blanket
coverage of many, many, many patents.” Look at the team that did
the amicus brief against the patent system in Festo.79 You had
Ford, IBM, and Kodak. They are distinguished by filing enormous
numbers of patents.80 They throw them against the wall and see
what will stick. “Here’s my portfolio of thousands of patents,
literally thousands of patents, now you will take a nonexclusive
license from me. If you don’t, I will find a patent and sue you.”
“Well, it might be invalid.”
“I do not care. I’ll find another one.”
“So here I’ve got a matrix of huge numbers of patents where I
don’t care which one is valid, I don’t care what the scope of any
one patent is. I have so many; it is going to be cheaper for you to
pay two percent on all your products. I do not care what the scope
of my patents are.”
At the same time, I don’t want to have individual patents that
are both valid, as Herb was saying, and have an indefinite scope,
because you might grab me. You might be a small inventor. You
might have your one project and you might have your one or two
patents. I do not want to be hamstrung. I want to be able to design
around you. I do not gain anything. If I never enforce my patents
for exclusivity, then I do not want to have broad patents.
Then, on the other side of the coin, you have innovators in
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, where one patent may be the

78

See id.; Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1477–81 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (finding that claims broader than the original description may be held to be invalid,
especially where the claim excludes an essential feature and the inventor admits doing so
after seeing the products of competitors).
79
Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543).
80
See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, Eureka! Labs With Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at
C1 (illustrating that in 2000, IBM was issued 2,922 U.S. patents and Kodak was issued
876 patents).
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be-all and end-all, and then you absolutely want to have this more
amorphous protection.81
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Any more comments from the
panel?
MR. JAKES: I agree with Hal that not having a doctrine of
equivalents does favor large corporate interests, most of whom I
represent. But I do think that there are those situations where there
needs to be something to redress the problem where you have a
small start-up company that has one or two patents and perhaps
does not really appreciate the scope of what they have. That is
why I was suggesting something like broadening reissue, maybe
throughout the life of the patent.82 I could deal with that.
I agree with Hal that the intervening rights problem needs a
solution. What the well-heeled patent interests do is they keep
continuations pending and they get around the reissue statute.83
They continue to file new claims. That is a practice that I am
engaged in all the time on behalf of our clients because it is
available to us.
Now, I do not want to suggest that the Federal Circuit should
abolish the doctrine of equivalents. Even they are probably not
that bold, having been instructed by the Supreme Court on a couple
of occasions that they have strayed too far.84 And, to be honest, I
really think any solution of that type would have to be a legislative
solution for it to be legitimate.
These are important questions of public policy and economic
interests, balancing between certainty on one side and the rights of

81

See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo (No.
00-1543).
82
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Chiron Corp., Festo (No. 00-1543). For a
discussion of broadening reissue, see Paul Heckel, Possible New Patent Bills,
International Property Creators, at http://www.ipcreators.org/Issues/posleg.htm (May 15,
2001).
83
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope
of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of
the original patent.”).
84
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo,
535 U.S. at 722.
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inventors on the other side. I think to truly be legitimate,
something like that would have to be legislated.
MR. WEGNER: Absolutely. I agree with you.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Hal, would you care to put this in
an international context?
MR. WEGNER: Yes. I think it is an unmitigated disaster. The
United States is used as a comparative model throughout the
world, particularly in patent law.85
If you take Japan alone, Japan has looked to the United States
as a model for reform of its own law.86 If you look at Prime
Minister Koizumi’s own web site,87 there is an intellectual property
policy outline which has a dramatic blueprint for the salvation of
the Japanese economy based upon reforms of the Japanese
system—to focus on intellectual property.88 It borrows from what
we did twenty years ago with both Bayh-Dole,89 which is not
relevant here, and more importantly, the Federal Circuit.90 The
Japanese have restructured their court system to consolidate

85

See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. [U.S. PTO],
GATT Uruguay Round Patent Law Changes, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/doc/uruguay/SUMMARY.html (last modified Mar. 1995) (outlining the
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 104 “to provide that evidence of inventive activity in the
territory of a WTO member country be treated the same as inventive activity in the
United States”).
86
See, e.g., STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
OUTLINE ch. 1.1, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/020703taikou_e.
html#1-1 (July 3, 2002) (noting that as early as the end of the nineteenth century, Japan
was observing the US system).
87
Official Web site of the Prime Minister of Japan, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
index-e.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
88
See STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 86.
89
The Bayh-Dole Act, enacted in 1980, encourages the transfer of university research
findings to the commercial markets, thus triggering the development of effective
patenting and licensing of inventions within universities and colleges nationwide. 35
U.S.C. §§ 202–212 (2000).
90
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and it
assumed the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Claims. Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
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patents in one or two fora and are moving forward to consolidate
all appeals to the Tokyo High Court.91
Around the world people look to see what we do. In the
Uruguay Round, we were saying we want to have strong patents.92
In the Geneva harmonization discussions, we were saying the
United States is a model; we insist upon a strong doctrine of
equivalents.93 We proposed a draft treaty on the doctrine of
equivalents in the 1980s which we do not even live up to today.94
It is terribly disruptive and it makes us look very bad
internationally when we have these sudden jolts of judicial
activism, or what Bill Rooklidge calls “judicial hyperactivity.”95 It
is awful.
Now, as a practical matter, a lot of the countries around the
world have seen TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights)96 as a heavy-handed American approach to shove patents
down people’s throats.97 There is still not an appreciation for
patents.
Well, in those countries, how is the judiciary going to interpret
a patent? They are never going to have a doctrine of equivalents at
this point in time. They do not need to for TRIPS. And, if
anything, they are going to do what the Japanese did twenty or
thirty years ago, providing no equivalents, and going further to
91

See STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 86.
See U.S. PTO, GATT Uruguay Round Patent Law Changes, at http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/SUMMARY.html (last modified Mar. 1995).
93
For a brief discussion on the changes brought to the doctrine of equivalents at the
Geneva Harmonization talks, see World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Committee
on the Law of Patents, at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_4/pdf/scp4_2.
pdf, at 12 (Sept. 25, 2000).
94
See Ray D. Weston, Jr., A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can
European Approaches Solve an American Dilemma, 39 J.L. & TECH. 35 (1998),
available at http://www.idea.piercelaw.edu/articles/39/39_1/2.Weston.pdf.
95
See Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 729.
96
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
97
See, e.g., Biplab Dasgupta, Patent Bills: Why this Hurry, Features: Legislation, at
http://www.ganashakti.com/old/1998/981221/featureeco.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)
(stating that the U.S., the WTO, and the World Bank pressured the Indian parliament to
enact patent legislation).
92

4 - PANEL I FORMAT

2003]

5/30/03 7:56 AM

EXAMINING THE FALLOUT FROM FESTO

749

exclude literally infringed embodiments by what is said in the
specification. This is almost what we are doing in the Federal
Circuit in some panels right now.98
As a practical matter, however, there is a different answer.
When you have an international portfolio, we have to rely on
strictly literal coverage.99 That has been the way it has been before
and it will continue, so it does not really have much of an impact in
that sense.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Having grown up in a literal
infringement-only environment, because I started off in England in
my professional career, which never had a doctrine of equivalents
until the European Patent Convention came along twenty years
ago,100 it is not such a bad environment to live with. It is unfair to
a small inventor in some cases. That is, I think, the balancing act
we have to face: where does the certainty—which is normally
desirable in economic law—end, and the justice that is deserved by
the small inventor take over?
The European Patent Convention was amended two years
ago.101 The draft of the Convention added a specific doctrine of
equivalents102 instead of the mumbo-jumbo there at the moment,
and it was going to add prosecution history estoppel103 and say that
the doctrine of equivalents is determined by whether everything
has the same function.104
At the very last minute, just as I think the first Festo decision
came down, they scrapped two-thirds of that, and in effect said, we
98
See, e.g., Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
99
See, e.g., Malcolm Royal & Ivan B. Ahlert, International Standard for Claim
Drafting, WIPO Conference on the International Patent System (Mar. 25–27, 2002)
(stating that in the draft treaty, the literal wording of the claims shall provide the primary
basis for their interpretation), http://patentagenda.wipo.int/ meetings/2002/presentations/
ahlert.pdf.
100
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, October 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
101
See Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 2001 O.J. E.P.O.
SPEC. ED. 3, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj001/12_01/
12_spe1.pdf.
102
See id.
103
See id.
104
See id.
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are going to have a doctrine of equivalents and we are not going to
tell you what it is—which is very unhelpful, I think. That, of
course, has not yet gone into effect.
Does anybody in the audience want to add or ask or contribute
in some way?
QUESTIONER: Lori Greendorfer. I am an associate at Salans
Hertzfeld Heilbronn Christy & Viener. I am working this weekend
on an amicus brief on behalf of FICPI [Fédération Internationale
des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle], and we filed amicus briefs
in the Supreme Court.
My question is about the importance of the harmonization of
the doctrine of equivalents between the United States and other
countries, where the Federal Circuit’s Festo decision upset any
hope of harmonization. Now, with their questions, are they
suggesting that they are trying to return to a complete bar rule? At
least that is how I read the September 20 decision.
MR. WEGNER: Well, it is interesting. If you take the Japan
comparative model, America bashed Japan in the 1980s in the
harmonization round in Geneva.105 Some people would say that
Japan now has a doctrine of equivalents.
There is the famous Tsubakimoto v. THK caseit is too hard
to pronounce Tsubakimoto, so we say the Ball Spline case.106 The
Supreme Court in Japan has a very tortuous test of the doctrine of
equivalents which narrowly follows the harmonization model that
we had in the 1980s.107 But the interesting point is the Japanese
Supreme Court still, today, has never, ever found infringement in
any case under the doctrine of equivalents. The Tsubakimoto case
resulted in a remand and there was no infringement.108

105

See, e.g., MINDY L. KOTLER & GARY W. HAMILTON, A GUIDE TO JAPAN’S PATENT
SYSTEM (1995) (outlining differences between U.S. and Japanese patent systems),
http://www.ta.doc.gov/Reports/JapanPatent/pages.pdf.
106
Tsubakimoto Seiko Co. v. THK K.K., 52 MINSHŪ 113 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1998)
(outlining the test for the doctrine of equivalents).
107
See id.
108
See id.
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I was involved in one case where there was infringement in the
Osaka District Court, Genentech v. Sumitomo,109 where I was an
expert declarant. Really now, in hindsight, you could say the relief
was granted in that case under an equivalents doctrine because of
pressure through our trade representative.
Equivalents rulings in Japan are very few in number. One
colleague said that there are about ten cases in the lower courts on
the doctrine of equivalents in the history of Japan. So there is
really no equivalents there.
Germany still is thinking back to the good old days of der
allgemeine Erfindungsgedanke—which predated the European
Patent Convention—providing infringement for those taking the
broad “inventive thoughts.”110 This was abolished by treaty, but
German courts still seem to find a broader interpretation than the
British do.
Being in these harmonization debates in the 1980s, I went to
Geneva one or two weeks a year for five years, as punishment or
whatever, and listened in the U.N. to people debating their own
laws. Most people who are the legislators and who are the patent
office officials do not know anything about equivalents; it is
outside their expertise. The patent office officials dominate these
discussions, and they don’t have anything to do with equivalents,
because they just grant the patents, they do not enforce them. It is
sort of like Saturday Night Live to hear everybody talk about their
own laws. So that is about where I think harmonization will go
internationally on equivalents.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I would agree with that.
Are there any other comments or questions from the audience?
QUESTIONER: My name is Larry Coury. I am a patent agent
at Fish & Neave and also an editor of the Intellectual Property Law
Journal here.

109

See Genentech Inc. v. Sumitomo Seiyaku K.K., 1586 HANREI JIHO 117 (Osaka High
Ct. Mar. 29, 1996) (invoking the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement).
110
See Frithjof E. Müller & Harold C. Wegner, The 1976 German Patent Law, 59 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC. 89, 121 & n.146 (1977) (discussing this German conception of “the
general inventive concept”).
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If you can accept the premise that the Federal Circuit is trying
to put certainty back into the patent system, I think there is still a
very high reversal rate of district court decisions by the Federal
Circuit. So maybe the certainty is not there, because the district
courts do not know what to do. I am wondering—where should
the court go from here to get to certainty?
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Mike, do you want to answer?
MR. JAKES: You make a very good point. You are probably
referring to the numbers that are often spoken about, that the
Federal Circuit reverses district courts close to fifty percent of the
time on claim interpretation issues.111 Part of that is a function of
the Federal Circuit’s de novo review, and that whatever the district
court says is more like a suggestion than anything else.
I was on a conference call with a district court judge. I will not
mention her name, but she is one who happens to hear lots of
patent cases. We talked about the trial and other items that we
were scheduling. During the course of that conversation, she did
make a very funny comment. She said, “You know, I really do not
decide cases. I just make the record for the Federal Circuit.”
There is a high reversal rate, and there is that element of
uncertainty just in the claim interpretation process as it is.112 Now,
you layer that with the doctrine of equivalents, and it is virtually
impossible to give any meaningful advice in certain situations to
clients who want to know what their business prospects are,
whether they should design around, and how they can design
around, when you compound that reversal rate.
Now, that reversal rate is also somewhat dependent on who the
particular Federal Circuit judges are. Some take a more charitable
view towards the district courts’ opinions and some have appointed
themselves as the final arbiter on all matters that have to do with
claim construction. And I do not think that the goal of certainty
has been achieved there as well, and I do not know that it will be.

111

Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001).
112
Id. at 1080–81.
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MR. WEGNER: I have a question for Mike and Herb. As we
know from the Vornado case,113 there are odd situations where
appellate jurisdiction goes to the regional circuit in patent cases. If
you had one of those odd situations and you had a very compelling
equitable case for equivalents, do you think there would be any
chance that a regional circuit would take the minority view in
Warner-Jenkinson and say it is a matter for a judge and create a
conflict?114
MR. SCHWARTZ: I am not very sanguine that that would
happen. I think most of the regional courts are really happy they
are not in the business anymore.
MR. JAKES: I think in those rare instances where a regional
circuit is going to hear a patent case, I think they will follow the
Federal Circuit down the line because it is the easiest thing to do.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would like to go back to Larry Coury’s
question and echo further what Mike said. The whole system
basically is really hung up on claim construction. I mean, that has
really turned—at least from a litigation point of view—the practice
of law inside-out and upside-down, and everything else flows from
that, because there is really no way to know where you are until the
claims are interpreted, and the claims do not get interpreted until
you get to the Federal Circuit. I mean, it is just as simple as that.
The judges who try lots of patent cases I think are even more
concerned about it. I think I may have in mind the same judge you
do. It doesn’t much matter. We were before her about a month
ago and she said that the Federal Circuit had reversed it again, had
reversed the claim construction and everyone was back. This was
not our case. She didn’t understand it, the parties didn’t
understand it, and they were not sure what to do with it.
MR. WEGNER: So what should be done?
MR. SCHWARTZ: What I think, which is sort of heresy, is
that there needs to be some deference given to the district judges’
interpretation.
113

See Holms Group, Inc. v. Vornado, 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 14 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
114
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MR. WEGNER: You mean you should defer to the judge? My
goodness!
MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is what was done in the practice of
law in this field in my childhood. You actually paid some
attention to what the district judge did, and you at least gave them
some credence for sorting out some sensible interpretations.
MR. WEGNER: How do we get to that result as a bar, as
individual litigants or as a bar? How do we teach Madison Place
that they should? I agree with you totally, but how do we get
there?
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think by just more pressure from
practitioners and jawboning judges, not when they’re before them
but off the bench and in other matters, to try to leave more to the
courts, because that will lead to more certainty than basically
deciding anew.
MR. WEGNER: Right, and it would certainly deter settlement
if you know that you’ve got a wild-card chance to go up to
Madison Place and “go fish.”
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, it deters settlement. And, more
importantly, as Mike said, it deters giving meaningful advice.
Really, in an awful lot of matters, you cannot give clients any
meaningful advice. When I was younger, you could give
meaningful advice. The whole purpose of being a lawyer was to
give advice. Now you just cannot do that. That overrides all of the
equivalence issues, it seems to me.
MR. JAKES: Absolutely.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Do you think that in order to
achieve this you need specialist patent courts?
MR. SCHWARTZ: No. I think that would make it worse.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Okay.
MR. WEGNER: Senator Grassley had proposed a few years
ago shrinking the number of judges in the Federal Circuit down to
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seven.115 Another solution is to merge it with the D.C. Circuit.
That is one solution that has been discussed over the last several
years—merging the two courts.
MR. JAKES: I am not sure what the answer is, how to turn
back the clock, at least with the Federal Circuit, and give more
deference to the district courts’ decisions.
In my clerkship for Judge Rich, I have to say that he was not
particularly deferential to any district court judge, or to the Patent
Office, or really to anybody else.
He was entitled to that because he was usually right. But that
is not always the case. My hopeand I don’t know whether the
bar can have much influence on thismy hope is that the Federal
Circuit is going to get tired of doing claim construction. The
closest analogy I can think of is in my days in law school, when
my constitutional law professor told me about the cases in the
1970s dealing with pornography. The Supreme Court in those
days felt that they had to decide every case themselves—they had
to look at the facts, and they had to consider every case as a matter
of constitutional law.116
This went on for a number of years, where there were just
hundreds of cases that they all had to look at. They had a
procedure whereby they would do thumbs-up or thumbs-down,
even without an opinion. This went on for several years. Finally,
they just got tired of it, and then the community standards opinion
was issued and they got out of the business.117 They just couldn’t
do it anymore. So my hope is that maybe the Federal Circuit, after
ten years of deciding every claim construction issue, will think this
isn’t such a great thing.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Any other questions or comments?
QUESTIONER: My name is David Perry-Campf. I am one of
the editors for the Journal.
115

See SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE CTS., 106TH CONG.,
REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS (1999), http://www.senate.gov/~grassley/graphics/federal.pdf.
116
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
117
See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 127 (1972) (citing Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
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I have a question, being a novice in this area. In Professor
Richards’ wonderful patents class we discussed Festo last week. I
took the Supreme Court’s decision to be struggling with the very
question this panel is struggling with—whether the doctrine of
equivalents is worth it and whether the uncertainty is worth it.
They come to the conclusion, echoing to some degree Judge
Rader’s dissent from the Federal Circuit, that it is worth it, because
otherwise you have copyists making insubstantial changes to get
around the patent if you do not have equivalents, and therefore to
allow infringement, and the patent holder would have no redress or
claim against that copyist. So the Supreme Court decides to keep
equivalents.
I am just wondering whether reissue would actually solve that
problem. I am thinking about a situation where if I have a patent
and I am in a world where there is no equivalents and copyist X
changes something insubstantial; then I have to reissue. I mean, it
sounds funny to say that equivalents is efficient, but it seems like a
much more efficient blanket that covers potential situations. I am
just wondering if getting rid of it, as opposed to limiting it, which
is what I think the Supreme Court intended to do in Festo, is
actually a good idea. All the panelists seemed to agree with Mr.
Jakes when he suggested that. I am wondering if that is actually
true.
MR. JAKES: You raise a good point about the efficiency of it.
I do not know that it is the solution because of one particular
problem, and that is the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Reissue sounds good as a philosophical matter. But in practice,
getting something through the Patent Office in time for it to be
meaningful is a problem.
But I can tell you from my own experience using the
continuation practice, that you can get very strong literal coverage
after a number of years, after you have really figured out what the
invention is worth, where the industry is going, and what your
competitors are doing. You do not need the doctrine of equivalents
if you follow that practice.
What a reissue allows you to do—or for a patentee who either
did not have the foresight to file a continuation or did not have the
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money to keep that going—is give you an option later in the patent
term.118
MR. WEGNER: The public gets nailed by the present practice.
If you think about the dynamics, the examiner is in a game of
trying to narrow your claims and giving you just narrow claims
and getting a disposal. Now, as Mike says, if you have many years
of Vogel trailers,119 keeping these continuations alive, the examiner
is in “examiner Disneyland.” They are getting disposal after
disposal after disposal.
And then, all of a sudden, you want this little, very narrow
claim. It can’t hurt anybody, can it? It is one that is fingerprinting
the accused infringing embodiment.
I think Mike is right that there is a frustration with going
through reissue, that in some industries you would like to get a
patent right away so you could bring a suit, but there are other
areas where you do not absolutely need to have the patent right
away. I am thinking particularly where you have a small company.
You cannot afford this Vogel trailer practice, cannot afford this
matrix of patents, and they come up to Fish & Neave or to
Finnegan & Henderson after they have gone to a mom-and-pop
patent shop to get their patent allowed, and they are so proud of it.
They give their beautiful sealed instrument to Mr. Schwartz, and
he gives it to one of his associates, and they say, “Oh, look, you’ve
got this little mistake that’s going to narrow it,” and then you have
to tell them, “You don’t have anything.”
That is just an unacceptable situation. If the system does not
work for the small inventor, it is not going to work for the rest of
us, and you are going to get all these angry universities and angry
small inventors railing against every change—irrationally so—but
they are very upset they have been burned by the system.
So if the small inventor comes to Fish & Neave or Finnegan &
Henderson and they are trying to get some capital together to
118

35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of
the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the
original patent.”).
119
In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See supra text accompanying notes 70–
71 for a discussion of Vogel trailers.
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develop something, and the invention is still being kept secret and
there is no competitor, the statutory change would help: Now, if
you simply do two things to the reissue statute, the inventor can be
helped—you say that intervening rights are keyed to the filing date
and you unblock the deadline for filing a broadening reissue.
Now, Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Jakes can say: “Well, we can save
you. There are no intervening rights so far. We can file a reissue
and we will get this reissue eventually, and you will be all right.”
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: If you do that, will you have to
beef up the circumstances in which you can claim intervening
rights?
MR. WEGNER: Oh, yes. You’ve got to get rid of all this
garbage. I’m sorry. That goes without saying. You don’t have to
plead original sin and that you didn’t have adultery in your heart
and everything else. You’ve got to get rid of all that stuff. Yes, of
course.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Perry-Campf]: I have a follow-up
question. If reissue is the Madame Chang horse, is that really what
we want to rely on, especially given the PTO’s recent new fee
structures and things it is issuing, which seem to illuminate
intention by the PTO to deter future activity with the PTO, or limit
its amount of work, especially given our interest in protecting
small inventors who might not be able to afford these new fees?
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I think reissue is going to be the
only way you can afford it with some of these new fees, isn’t it?
MR. JAKES: I do believe that the fees have some effect, they
do influence people, but most patents are never used for anything,
they never go anywhere. Reissue, even if it were relatively
expensive, and you are still talking about probably significant
attorney’s fees to conduct something like that, would probably not
be enough of a deterrent that it could not be a solution. But I view
that as more of a nicety than an absolute bar to the problem.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: With reissue you’ve got the
situation where you are paying the money when you know it is
something that is really worth spending the money on. When you
are filing the patent application, you really just have to hope that
something is going to happen.
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MR. JAKES: You know, of course, this whole discussion of
reissue is Justice Black’s dissent in Graver Tank,120 so it is not like
it is entirely an original thought. Other people have expressed this
as well.121
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Does anybody else have any
questions or comments from the floor?
Can I bring foreseeability into the discussion? Exactly what do
we mean by foreseeability? Professor Adelman has been pushing
this very hard, particularly at conferences here for the last three or
four years, as being the test for doctrine of equivalents.122
MR. JAKES: The Judge Rader test?
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Yes. This was the test adopted by
Judge Rader in Johnson.123
MR. WEGNER: Go ahead, Herb. He is your friend.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don’t know really how to comment on it.
Foreseeability in this context, as I said, gives rise to another factual
issue, which I do not think we ought to have. That is my problem
with it. And it is also ultimately a clash of experts who decide it.
So it leads to uncertainty rather than certainty, so I think I have
problems with it.
MR. WEGNER: Foreseeability came in the 1980s from Heinz
Bardehle in the Geneva patent discussions as a rallying cry for why
we need equivalents altogether,124 not that it should be limited to
120

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting).
121
See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 719
(1989) (“The use of the doctrine of equivalents to upset [the reissue procedure] cannot be
justified.”); Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1045, 1055 n.25 (2001).
122
See Martin Adelman, Is the Use of the Doctrine of Equivalents to Fix Mistakes a
Mistake?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2000) (“It is my opinion that covering afterarising equivalents should be the central function of a judicially administered doctrine of
equivalents.”).
123
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056–60 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, J., concurring).
124
See Bardehle, Pagenberg, Dost, Alenburg & Giessler, Heinz Bardehle, Bardehle:
Publications, at http://www.bardehle.com/en/publications.html#bardehle (last visited
Apr. 10, 2003).
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foreseeability. Heinz Bardehle, who was the general patent
counsel at Siemens many years ago and has been a leading private
patent practitioner for the last generation or so, gave the
example—what happens if you turn the clock back before the
transistor when you had radio tubes. At that time, what happened
if you had a new improvement in an invention that had nothing to
do with the tubes, but you had a claim to a combination of vacuum
tubes plus X, Y, or Z, and now what happens when the transistor is
invented? If you do not have equivalents, you cannot foresee this,
then all the patents to new innovations that were tied in a
combination claim to a vacuum tube would be obsolete.
That is where a lot of this came from in the 1980s, and this
spread through the literature. But it was never an idea that Heinz
or I had that this should be the only area where equivalents should
apply.
I go back. Mike mentioned what I was doing ten years ago,
wasting time writing on things that nobody was reading.125
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I was reading it.
MR. WEGNER: Well, you wrote on it, too.126
I go back. If you want to talk a little history of great jurists, in
this generation we think of his judge, Judge Rich, who was truly a
great person. But in the context of history there are two people
who would compete very heavily as great patent jurists. He
mentioned Learned Hand.
The other one is Joseph Story. Joseph Story, if you look at his
portrait in the Supreme Court, you will see a plaque explaining
what he has done. It goes on forever and ever. It does not even
mention patent law. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in
1813 and had a remarkably long career, until 1845.127 He was the
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University. In the old days,
each Justice rode circuit. They spent very little of their time in
Washington. He was picked to be the Circuit Justice for Boston
125

See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 63, at 7–8.
See John Richards, International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 433 (1993).
127
R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC (1985).
126
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and he had all these trials in Boston. This is where the doctrine of
equivalents was born.
So it is dismissed. Some of Story’s work, like in the case of
experimental use, is dismissed as just being some case law maybe
of some odd, obscure judge. This was Joseph Story, who really
created the patent law, more so than any one person in this country.
He had an advantage over Judge Rich and Learned Hand.
There was pretty much a blank slate on which to write. But he
created the doctrine of equivalents in 1814 and it was an equitable
doctrine.128
I would love to see us go back to Story’s philosophy. He said
that you should not permit a colorable variation.129 If you look at
the contemporaneous meaning of colorable, it connotes
deviousness, it means cheating, it means stealing.130 You should
not be able to permit somebody to just carve around the niches of a
claim, where it is obvious that the inventor had sought more
protection. As Mike said, in those days, they didn’t even have
claims.
MR. JAKES: I would like to make a couple of comments on
foreseeability.
There are several open questions that I think are likely to be
addressed. For example, one that comes to mind is the timeframe
at which foreseeability will be determined. As I recall from the
Supreme Court’s opinion, it mentioned both time of the
amendment and time of the application.131 That is an ambiguity in
the Court’s opinion as to when that foreseeability determination
will be made.
More likely, I think that the foreseeability determination is
going to break down into a discussion of after-developed
128

See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
Id. (charging the jury to consider “whether the machines used by the defendant are
substantially, in their principles and mode of operation, like the plaintiff’s machines”).
130
See III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 503 (2d ed. 1989) (defining colorable as
“[c]overt, pretended, feigned, counterfeit, collusory, done for appearance’ sake” and
providing contextual references contemporary to Justice Story demonstrating such a
denotation).
131
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739–40
(2002).
129
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technology. If something was currently available at the time of the
application, then my guess is that it may be deemed foreseeable
and something that was developed later will not.
We faced some of this debate already in a case that I argued
this May, which was decided fairly recently, which involved a
claim that was directed to two pieces of an assembly for a cable
filter.132 “A front cap and a rear insert” was the way it was
claimed.133 The accused infringer in the case uses a single piece.
After the decision came out, there was some debate with the
Federal Circuit, with my opponent submitting authority saying that
the foreseeability test should be applied.134 So I suspect that in
front of the district court we are going to see that argument as to
whether a one-piece assembly was actually foreseeable.
But, as Herb says, this will complicate the litigation by creating
a potentially new factual issue. And how do you prove it? What
type of evidence do you allow? Is it a person skilled in the art? Is
it a reasonable patent attorney who should have known that he
should have drafted claims of a certain breadth?
I do not know that we will see Festo hearings, like Markman
hearings, but I would not have told you ten years ago that we
would have Markman hearings.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Yes?
QUESTIONER: My name is Dave Torrente. I am a patent
agent for a suburban firm and also a student here at the Law
School.
Mr. Wegner, you just mentioned about the copyist carving
around a niche of the claim. If it seems like the general feeling of
the panel is that if we can find a way to get rid of the doctrine of
equivalents, that would not be all bad.

132

Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communications Labs., Inc. 305 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
133
Id. at 1307–08.
134
Submissions by Arrow led to a substituted opinion. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow
Communications Labs., Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 995 (2003). The case was remanded to the district court.

4 - PANEL I FORMAT

2003]

5/30/03 7:56 AM

EXAMINING THE FALLOUT FROM FESTO

763

Is it absolutely necessary that the prosecution history be public
record? It seems to me that that is one tool that a copyist will
frequently use is to go to the prosecution history and see where the
applicant tried to get broader claims but was forced to narrow to
get it past the examiner.
MR. WEGNER: That is a very good question.
First, I want to make it clear that I would favor a doctrine of
equivalents. I am explaining that some industries do not like
equivalents.
But with respect to prosecution history estoppel, one of the
most refreshing new scholars on the scene is Professor John R.
Thomas, who just recently went to Georgetown University Law
Center. He has something over almost everyone else in the
academic and practice world. He is a comparative scholar. He has
been at the Max Planck Institute for a year, and then at Chizaiken
in Tokyo for a considerable period of time. So, he looks at things
from a comparative standpoint.
He had a debate with Don Dunner a year ago at the Giles
Sutherland Rich American Inn of Court, where he said, let’s burn
the file wrappers. That is a radical thought, but it is something to
consider. Even though I have lived abroad, too, and done some
comparative scholarship, this shocked me. I am not saying I am
ready to go that far, to burn the file wrappers.
But Canada’s Supreme Court recently said they’ve looked at
our prosecution history estoppel and they repudiate it.135
Sir Robin Jacob, a bit ago, wrote an opinion where he had to
interpret American law—he had to interpret Festo.136 Can you
imagine anyone so careless to draft a license agreement (a) to be
interpreted under British law by British courts, and (b) where the
grant clause is tied to the scope of an American patent? That is
135

Free World Trust v. Electro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (finding that the
greater the level of discretion left to the courts to look beyond the claim language in a
search for the spirit of the invention, the less the claims perform their public notice
function and the greater the resulting level of uncertainty and unpredictability).
136
Celltech Chiroscience Ltd v. MedImmune Inc., [2002] E.W.H.C. 2167 (Ch. Patents
Ct.) (Eng. & Wales), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2002/
2167.html.
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exactly what Sir Robin faced. He did a very nice job analyzing
Festo and artfully shows the weakness of the American law. He,
in essence, says as to the application of such law to the United
Kingdom, that they’re not going to touch that over in their
country.137
It is an interesting concept. We will never unilaterally in the
foreseeable future eliminate prosecution history estoppel. My own
feeling is if someone says to the examiner that something is
disclaimed, something is not covered, that he should be stuck with
that. To me, prosecution history estoppel has been an invaluable
tool. The classic prosecution history estoppel has been an
invaluable tool to predict with certainty a pathway to design
around inventions, and I would be horrified to lose that tool.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I think if we don’t, we go back to
the claiming “nose of wax”138 of 120 years ago, so there is an issue
there.
The Supreme Court of Canada regarded the prosecution history
estoppel as a can of worms, I think they said, in the Electro Santé
case.139 Is that right?
Anybody else have anything?
MR. JAKES: I am not sure I would know how to practice
without being able to look at the file history. But I guess I am
open to new suggestions as well, and I did hear Professor Jay
Thomas’s speech on that.
Just to make myself clear, I am not necessarily advocating
abolishing the doctrine of equivalents. I think it deserves some
137

See id.
See White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886). This case presents the famous “nose of
wax” analogy, where the Supreme Court stated that:
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax,
which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the
specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something
different from, what its words express. . . . The claim is a statutory
requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define
precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an
evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of
its terms.
Id. at 51–52.
139
Free World Trust v. Electro Santé, [2002] 2 S.C.R. at 1024.
138
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thought, though, because of the problems with it. I think there is a
problem that the doctrine of equivalents addresses, but I have
watched the Federal Circuit struggle for twenty years trying to
make it workable.140 It is probably the best we have, at least at the
moment, and so I think we should think about alternatives if it
truly is unworkable.
Looking at the file history, though, I just do not think that is
going to change, at least in the near future, at least for claim
interpretation purposes, because there is valuable information in
the file history if your goal is certainty, to look at it. I do not have
any problems with competitors picking apart the file history and
using it as a way to determine how they should structure their
actions, because, if anything, I think more information is helpful in
that circumstance.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Would you draw any distinction
between prosecution history estoppel and using the file history for
interpretation of the claims?
MR. JAKES: Certainly the Federal Circuit draws a distinction.
Sometimes I fail to see the difference.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I was going to go back to your comment
about the doctrine of equivalents. I, too, do not want to abolish it.
The problem I have is the way it has been interpreted and used.
I think one other thing that has driven the Federal Circuit is the
jury system in this country, which, as we all know, is unique in the
patent world with the initial strengthening of patents and the use of
the doctrine of equivalents by juries. At least in jury trials
probably in the early 1980s, the doctrine of equivalents was the
vehicle to right any wrong, basically.141 That is really where a lot
of this stems from.

140

See Jay I. Alexander, Cabining the Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A Historical
Perspective on the Relationship Between the Doctrines of Equivalents and Prosecution
History Estoppel, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2002).
141
See, e.g., Molinaro v. Hart Elecs. Corp. of Scranton, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735, 747–
50 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that the exact scope of protection given by means of the
doctrine of equivalents tends to vary depending upon the circumstances), aff’d, 646 F.2d
983 (3d Cir. 1982). However, in the mid-1990s, the doctrine was under attack as
granting too much power to the patentee. An inventor with a challenged patent had a
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I think no person who is knowledgeable in the field would
think that the doctrine of equivalents is just out there to rewrite the
patent by any jury that wants to and then just leave it, in effect,
immune from attack on appeal on the reviewing standard of clear
and convincing error.
That is what has really driven all of this, the jury system in
combination with essentially otherwise-valid patents. The Federal
Circuit has just really been cutting back on that, poking at it here,
there, and everywhere, and it has just made a crazy-quilt pattern
that is almost impossible to deal with.
MR. WEGNER: Yes. And that is exactly why I want an equity
solution, because I completely agree with what Herb says, that it is
the jury that is driving us all crazy by determining what the
equivalents are. So that is why I wanted to have equivalents
determined as a matter of equity, where the judges could in very
rare, limited circumstances apply the doctrine. It would be much
as in the case of Potter Stuart and pornography, to know it when
one sees it.142 Only in some very clear equitable situation would
you apply the doctrine of equivalents. It should be a very, very
narrow application. But you leave it to a jury, and then you get the
mess we’re in today.
I was on a panel in Melbourne a year ago. A British barrister
said, “You Americans, you are always getting so involved with
mens rea.” When you get into equivalents with a jury you are
always going to favor the patent owner against the big, bad
infringer, thinking about enablement and what is going on in the
mind of the infringer.
We are uniquely crazy in our mens rea fascination. I would
love to have reformthat is why I want equity. I mean, Herb is
absolutely right on the jury thing.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: What would you put into the
analysis?
MR. SCHWARTZ: Potter Stewart.143
difficult task in trying to ascertain just what a court might not find to be an equivalent.
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
142
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
143
See id.

4 - PANEL I FORMAT

2003]

5/30/03 7:56 AM

EXAMINING THE FALLOUT FROM FESTO

767

PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Just when you see it?
MR. SCHWARTZ: Right now it is a question of fact for the
jury. Without all of the engrafting that the Federal Circuit has
done, in theory the jury could do almost anything. When you think
about it, the jury really, in most of the other areas, has something
to compare it against, if they are dealing with anticipation, if they
are smart enough to understand that. Even in obviousness, there is
something to understand. On equivalents, it is the first and last
time in their life that they ever see it. The arguments are purely
equitable, and the so-called legal tests are something that even
scholars do not understand. How a jury is supposed to understand
what is right or wrong in the one time in their life they see it is
really very difficult, and I think driven by the equity above and
beyond what the patent system allows.
MR. WEGNER: You really have to go through a trial with a
jury to see this stuff. I had a failed marriage counselor as my jury
consultant about six years ago to prepare me as an expert witness.
He was explaining how ninety-four percent of the effectiveness of
the witness is how you look and feel and act. He is now known as
Dr. Phil, after he prepped Oprah Winfrey. He was admitting that
he was a failed marriage counselor. He played a major role in the
trial. But, that is not how justice should be done. It should not
become a talk show.
MR. JAKES: I think of a concurring opinion that Judge Plager
wrote.144 He often has a cynical view of the doctrine of
equivalents, or you can draw that from his opinions. In that
particular case, the court was remanding back for a factual
determination on equivalency. Judge Plager in his opinion said,
“May the best lawyer win.”145
MR. WEGNER: Yes.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Hal, would you have a go at trying
to wrap up what you think we have accomplished this morning?
MR. WEGNER: Well, we can each take a turn at that.
144

See Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Plager, J.,
concurring).
145
Id.
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I think the bottom line on Festo from a practical standpoint is
that it really does not change too much in the way top-of-the-line
law firms and lawyers have practiced in terms of procurement. We
have never prospectively ever, ever, ever relied upon the doctrine
of equivalents.
What we need to do as practitioners is to have the humility to
understand that we cannot always write the most perfect
application, and we should take the benefit of hindsight to criticize
our own work. As long as we keep an invention secret during the
eighteen-month time window after filing, every time we pick up an
application, for whatever reasonto respond to an office action, to
do an information disclosure statement, discuss it with a
clientwe should look at the claims from the standpoint of the
pirate, the third party who might want to chisel around our
invention: Where are the weak points in my application? Where
does my client not cover something that could be covered?
And when we find some mistake that we have made, a mistake
in hindsight, we file another case and another case. We file as
many cases as we can in this eighteen-month period and get a
matrix of protection and go forward with that.
And we follow what Mike Jakes said at the tail end of the
procurement road. When we pay our issue fee, we file a Vogel
trailer. In re Vogel146remember, this is the case that taught us
that pork is not meat. (Isn’t that odd? Did you know that pork
isn’t meat? I am still fascinated by that case.)
So that is what I see for procurement. I will leave it to Herb to
talk about what he thinks about the litigation consequences.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would actually like to go back to
something which I didn’t mention earlier, but which I was
reflecting on in listening to all of this.
I had the unusual pleasure of being the Special Master who
tried Festo in the initial instance.147 It was referred to me by Judge
146

In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also supra text accompanying notes
70–71 for a discussion of Vogel trailers.
147
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. 88-CV-1814, 1994 WL
1743984 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated by 520
U.S. 1111 (1997).
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Mazzone in Boston. I was given Judge Harrington’s courtroom
and tried it for three weeks. My decision is referred to in the
reported decision when you see it.148 When it was before me, it
was something that I figured would be gone in two weeks or a
year. That shows you how little I knew about it.
I formed definite views on the equivalents issues as a matter of
fact, just in my own mind, as to what was fair and what was
reasonable. I concluded, at that time, that one of the patents was
barred on file wrapper estoppel and the second one was not,149
which is a split that nobody else has come up with since, basically.
I actually had a view that, reading the file history, a reasonable
person would assume that the patent owner had given away the
magnetic limitation on the Stoll patent, and therefore it wasn’t fair
for him to recapture it.150 Whereas, the other limitation of two
versus one was trivial and was really plainly a design-around of the
claims that had no meaning of substance.151
Now, that is a type of result you could get by looking at it
simply on the equity, which is what I did at the time and which you
could do under the law then. This was eleven years ago,
amazingly enough.
But if you look through the opinions now, the tests that are
going to come up probably would not allow that result at all. The
way they are interpreting foreseeability and the other doctrines,
they are going to either throw it all in or throw it all out. To me, it
gets rid of what I would think the initial purpose of that doctrine
was: to do equity in the rare case.
MR. WEGNER: In the rare case.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, which is where I am with Hal.
And so I think that the sum of it is that the doctrine has lost or
is losing its way in terms of what it really should accomplish,
especially in this particular case.

148
149
150
151

See id. at *1–*6.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *4.
See id. at *6.
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MR. JAKES: I, too, would like to see the doctrine returned to
its equitable roots and be a question for the judge.
One thing I would like to mention in closing is that, for all the
attention that we have focused on Festo, the Supreme Court’s
opinion leaves intact a large body of Federal Circuit law on the
doctrine of equivalents. It is relatively untouched. Following the
cases, as I have and many others have over the years, the Federal
Circuit has taken an increasingly restrictive view of the doctrine of
equivalents, regardless of what it did in Festo, Festo being just one
manifestation, I think, of its efforts in that area.152
So the Supreme Court has left most of that law intact and
embraced it in the Warner-Jenkinson case.153 So we do have today
a fairly narrow doctrine of equivalents, which I believe is its
appropriate role.
I would also prefer to see it addressed by a judge rather than a
jury, because I think we would get better results in that
circumstance. But if we are going to have a doctrine—and we do
need something to address those situations where the application is
not perfect—then having it very narrowly circumscribed I think is
the best thing.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you all.

152
153

See Alexander, supra note 140.
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).

